21st Army Group and the Battle of Normandy

With the 70^th anniversary of the D-Day landings coming up next year, we will no doubt see a publishing frenzy about D-Day and the Battle of Normandy. This might not be on the scale of First World War publications but will be significant nether the less. The British and Canadian performance in the Battle of Normandy is a subject of very differing and strong views. One book that has come out in recent months is a reappraisal of the efforts of 21^st Army Group in the entire North West Europe Campaign. ‘Monty’s Men: The British Army and the Liberation of Europe’ (John Buckley) provides a very convincing argument for the delays suffered in the Normandy campaign and highlights the fact that 21^st Army group was drawing the bulk of German Panzer strength on to their front.

This is a view that I tend to agree with, and while there were delays and setbacks the overall campaign achieved the objective of destroying the German Forces in Normandy and also inflicting such catastrophic damage upon long term ability of the German armed forces to oppose the advance on Germany via Normandy.

Due to the losses suffered by German formations (Wehrmacht, SS and Luftwaffe) and the collapse of German resistance in Normandy; the actual timetable and objectives were ahead of the planned dates. The breakout and advance across Belgium became known as the “Great Swan” due to the pace and lack of resistance in the way of 21^st Army Group.

Performance was certainly varied among units that made up 21^st Army Group, but as a whole it performed well and to expectations. Certain Operations could have been carried out better or had more detailed realistic plans (such as Operation Goodwood). However General Montgomery certainly did not help matters both before, during and after the campaign in Normandy had been won. His sweeping statements regarding the level of success that would be achieved by individual operations meant that expectations were high and invariably difficult to meet/ achieve in the best of circumstances. However the plans were required to be bold in order to guarantee the resources that were needed. Goodwood is a prime example of having to twist the arm of the RAF for the use of heavy bombers in a tactical role, something that would not be possible if the scope and aims of the operation were modest.

Over the next few months I plan to delve into the performance of 21^st Army Group in Normandy using a wide range of sources and where time permits plenty material from the National Archives.

This weekend just gone, I had the pleasure of attending the Guild of Battlefield Guides Annual General Meeting Weekend. This was the second year that I attended and matched the standards of the previous one. The level of knowledge in the building was very high as was the enthusiasm for delivering excellent battlefield tours.

It was a great weekend for making contacts and for finding out a number of ongoing projects related to the 100^th anniversary of the First World War.

Battle of Mons- Photosource: Authors Collection

I came away with a renewed commitment to leading a few tours for friends and family next year and for putting some serious thought into starting on the path to the coveted ‘Badge’. Validation for this involves a number of assignments beginning with a 20 minute presentation (stand) on a battle of your choosing. I have a few in mind so it will be an eventful few months of planning and researching a number of stands and hopefully visits as well.  

Syria and The Continuing Conflict

There was a very interesting article published on the Guardian website a couple of days ago (the 18^th of November 2013). The article addressed the growing realisation that the war is shifting or has shifted from a revolution against the government of Assad and is now a full civil war.

The author spends time with three members of a rebel battalion and speaks at length about how there is no unity and how the Assad forces are hitting them from the front and the Jihadist forces are effectively hitting them from behind. It makes for sombre reading as the problems faced are many and paints a clear picture of the danger that faces Syria. Syria being consigned to an ongoing struggle between the myriad groups opposing Assad and the regime. One of the subjects of the article says that this might take 10 years to resolve and for a coherent unified Syria to emerge post Assad. However if Assad were to fall now then the country would become split in to mini states of warring tribes, Islamists and battalions. This would not be a bright future either for Syria or the region. For a glimpse into the confusing world of factional and ideological identities; the accidental wrong identification and beheading of a wounded rebel does not bode well (Article is here).

The article that is the subject of this post does make a very good point when the commander of a rebel battalion states that for the most part the rebels know only how to fight and seize areas from the pro government forces. The Jihadists on the other hand set up governance and a form of stability, this stability is what is helping the Jihadists and more extreme elements gain ground and importantly exercise control even after they have moved on.    

Without stability and a credible alternative to Assad it is an uphill struggle for the rebel forces.

The real question is can stability ever exist post Assad and will there be a credible alternative that is not one controlled by Jihadist factions?

The conflict has been dragging on and certainly shows no sign of slowing down despite the potential tipping point over chemical weapons in the summer. For the Syrian people the future is bleak and likely to involve instability for some time to come. So far casualties have exceeded 120,000 as this article points out. The article also confirms the position that the conflict shows no sign of slowing down.

The comments provided at the end of the Guardian article make for reading that is both alarming and comical. There are some posts of merit in the comments, however a fair number descend into conspiracy and unsupported accusations leveled at various nations. 

Prisoners of War on the Battlefield

Still image from Helmet Camera footage. Photo Source: Ministry Of Defence/PA

The trial of the three Royal Marines accused of executing a member of the Taliban has come to a close with two of them being acquitted and a third known as “Marine A” being found guilty. This has lead to an interesting debate involving a number of serving and former officers from various services relating to the sentence “Marine A” should receive. These range from a call for leniency through to no leniency and “Marine A” facing the full sentence possible as “murder is still murder”. This Article strikes a good balance in discussing such an emotive issue. 

Warfare is never clear cut and the taking of prisoners is always a very dangerous time for all parties involved. There is always the worry that perhaps the enemy combatant is not sincere in their surrender, that perhaps at the first opportunity will seek to harm his captors when there attention is elsewhere. 

This case however is one of the more clear cut ones as the enemy combatant in this case was severely wounded and posed no direct threat to the Marines involved. Indeed it seems that this was carried out with malice and with revenge for the casualties suffered by the Marines unit and the displaying of body parts as trophies. 

While it has to be remembered that the serving soldiers are under a huge pressure and strain, this does not give them a free card in how they behave. It was an exceptionally foolish thing to do and one that brings the British armed forces and the wider forces that are part of ISAF into disrepute. 

Many soldiers,sailors and airmen serve as part of ISAF and this incident involves a very minor percentage, let us hope that it remains this way and cases of this nature will still shock us when they do occur. 

11 November 2013

Another year and another remembrance Sunday full of debate relating to the wearing of the Poppy, the ongoing conflict in Afghanistan, foreign policy and the ugly spectre of burning poppies. Each year the debates tend to run along the same lines. Next year will be very interesting with the anniversary of the Great War and the draw down of all forces from Afghanistan. I expect there will be a lot more commentary about what the poppy symbolises, the 'lost generation' and hopefully a lot less relating to Britains foreign policy of the last 12 years.

As we approach the centenary of the outbreak of the Great War the annual Poppy Appeal has become a broader battleground. Parties from both sides of the fence and those with no real interest the political aspects of wearing a poppy have become increasingly vocal.
Last week the national media was full of commentary attacking each view on why the commentator would or would not be wearing a poppy. I think that debate on wearing a poppy is healthy and not something you should stifle even if I disagree with some reasons for not wearing one. The fact that we have a choice to wear a poppy and the fact that we are allowed to decide a reason for wearing one should say a lot about our society. For myself I wear a poppy in remembrance and to support the work of the Royal British Legion. This is especially important given the increase in take up of it’s services over the last ten years due to increased military activity in both Iraq and Afghanistan.

There was a very good article that I read on the website of the Wallstreet Journal. While I knew a little about the Cenotaph and how it was originally meant to only be temporary, the article filled a gap in my knowledge and gave me a better understanding regarding its design and construction.
The article can be found here.


I would also like to advertise a friend’s writing blog as he has written a very short story based on the morning of the 1st of July 1916. He is a budding author so if historical fiction is something that interests you please check it out.

Lessons From The Last War

I have been reading an article (Lessons From The Last War - Predicting The Next War) today regarding nation’s that have prepared for future wars based on the previous war. One of the examples used in the article was the approach of both Germany and France in the lead up to the campaign in 1940. The article argued that while both nations went down very different paths, both could be said to have taken lessons from the last war.

In the case of France it prepared to fight the next war by the standards of the last war and was tied in to a firepower based doctrine for attacking. 

The Germans on the other hand took the lessons from the last war to show that a mobile approach to warfare was needed and that the what was needed was a concentration of armour to force a break through and push for the enemy rear and center of communications etc.

The part of the article that got me thinking however was how the author showed that actually both lessons from the last war were applicable to the war in question. While the German approach worked in part due to the lack of adequate anti-tank weaponry in appropriate proportions, as the war progressed and the anti-tank density increased the French lessons became more applicable to the conduct of the war especially when it came to breaking the determined German defensive positions in Normandy.

The second example used for the article is the lessons from the 1967 ‘Six Day War’ between the Israeli Defence Force (IDF) and Egypt and their application during the war in 1973. Once again the article points out how the lessons were learned and then applied in each case.  The example is concluded that while the IDF suffered significant casualties especially to its tank formations, it still emerged victorious. The author also points out that had the IDF taken a different route as various commentators suggested the casualties might have been greater and Egyptian gains more permanent due to the loss of mobility. Israel drew an important lesson from the 1973 war and that was that the IDF was too small for the wars it was having to fight.

The author concludes the article by making the point that lessons can be learned from past wars but doctrine should not be fixed on these lessons as it is very likely that others have also studied previous wars and drew their own lessons. The author does warn not too be too flexible as the jack of all trades is the master of none. The closing point is one that is applicable to most walks of life; preparation, training, research into past wars and studying the theories will lead to success. 

I can recommend The Journal of Military Operations as not only is it free to access but it also contains good articles written with present day operations in mind. 

Syria and Social Media

Over the last few weeks the ongoing conflict in Syria combined with the use of chemical weapons has been at the forefront of the news. The talk of western intervention has also generated a lot of lot of interest in the media (both mainstream media and smaller media outlets). The reporting has varied massively both on the actual subject at hand and in quality.
One thing that has stuck out in all of this however is how engaging the conflict in Syria has become. Almost daily there are posts appearing in my Facebook feed where friends have either linked an article or given their own opinions on the conflict and any intervention that may occur.
The commentary is a refreshing change from the usual everyday goings on that normally fills my Facebook feed. I have also noticed that virtually every post about Syria is getting a number of responses and debates are taking place, normally leading to further posts by those participating.
The like the journalism on the conflict, these social media posts vary in quality and offer a wide range of views. The most interesting ones tend to be related to US intervention in the conflict with a good number of commentators suggesting that this will be a repeat of Iraq and that Syria doesn't have chemical weapons (or tries to draw comparisons with the Israeli use of White Phosphorus). I find these interesting and normally have to point out that it is not a secret that the Syrian regime has chemical weapons and that the actual question lies in who used them.

While I don't agree with every post that I read relating to the Syrian conflict, I view the coverage on social media as a good thing and further more think that this type of engagement is what is needed for people to actually understand the conflict rather than just relying on their chosen news outlet.

Syria and the use of Chemical Weapons

With the shocking evidence of the use of chemical weapons and the finger being firmly pointed in the direction of the Assad regime, this article from the Royal United Services Institute (RUSI) offers a solution to the problem of finding out who is the culprit.

Eyes over Syria: Using Drones to Monitor Atrocities

While the article that I have linked from the RUSI website provides a solution for monitoring the conflict within Syria in a very realistic way, it does not solve 100% who was to blame for the latest atrocity.
It must be said that it is highly likely that the regime is too blame for this and action does need to be taken to prevent further lines in the conflict being crossed. However should this atrocity be the basis for Western intervention in Syria?
My own personal opinion is that intervention should be the absolute last resort and ideally should come from a regional state actor. The west can however play its part by imposing embargoes and ensuring that other UN member states adhere to these (such as Russia and China). This however is unlikely as Assad still has friends who can lessen the effects or stop them all togther when it comes to the US and UK.
This is why the use of UAV's (Unmanned Aerial Vehicles) can prove to be such a game changer. It will appease Assad's friends in Russia and China, even if it doesn't appease them it will be hard for them to block a UN resolution that does not risk lives and offers impartial surveillance that is available 24/7.
It will give a good indication of what is going on in the country and perhaps lead both sides to the peace table in the long run when both sides realise that they will be held accountable.